I. Introduction
This paper examines the impact of works councils on environmental investment by firms at the establishment level. These councils have been defined as "institutionalized bodies for representative communication between a single employer... and the employees... of a single plant or enterprise" (Rogers and Streeck 1995: p. 6 ). This definition excludes conventional unions, quality circles and similar nonrepresentative participation, as well as most employee representation at the board level. Economic studies on works councils usually focus on the impact of works councils on firm productivity (FitzRoy and Kraft 1987) , profits (Addison, Schnabel and Wagner 1996) , dismissals, quits and hiring (Frick and Sadowski 1995) and the use of performance pay (Heywood, Hübler and Jirjahn 1998; Heywood and Jirjahn 2002) . While councils might have additional effects on other aspects of firm performance and social welfare, the literature to date has not well recognized these aspects. Vanek (1970 Vanek ( , 1971 suggested that firms with substantial employee voice may invest more in pollution abatement than conventional firms, even though employees have to pay for it through reduced wages.
1 Dreze (1976) and Dreze and Hagen (1978) derived related welfare benefits of employee voice in reducing occupational hazards in a general equilibrium setting. However, the role of councils in solving local environment underinvestment has not been examined, and little analytic treatment of employee voice in providing investment cooperation has been available.
Our study is the first to address the involvement of works councils in environmental investments.
We investigate different kinds of environmental investments, which may have different effects for workers' and firm owners' utilities. Some environmental problems are workplace related, and
thus correspond to what is usually termed workplace hazards. Several studies look at compensating wage differentials for job risks and adverse health effects related to production activity (e.g., and Siebert and Wei 1994) . Wage compensation is often determined through bargaining between unions and firms. Weil (1999) shows that mandated institutions may supplement the role played by unions in the enforcement of workplace regulations. Firms and workers may also be concerned with environmental impacts on locations away from the workplace, such as where workers or customers live, or that may have an effect on public relations or political scrutiny. To date, no empirical study has addressed the role of unions or cooperative arrangements such as works councils in solving external environmental impacts, for which employees and firm owners may have different interests depending on the type of environmental impact present and the distribution of its effects.
In this paper we consider three possible cases: First, workers prefer environmental investment to reduce occupational health problems or to reduce regional pollution affecting their families, but internalizing external effects is not profitable for owners. Second, management prefers environmental investment because it has positive productivity effects or public relations benefits.
Third, both parties prefer environmental investment, though perhaps at different levels. We draw on the works council and codetermination literature, as well as recent bargaining literature, to
show why there may be in all three cases underinvestment in pollution abatement activities even from the private point of view of the firm's owners and employees. Works councils may be an instrument for firms to implement investments or changes in organization in cases of imperfect contracts and concerns about opportunism. They may provide a credible institution because they can simultaneously influence investment activities and information flow, and thereby jointly allow for the interdependent effects of wage bargaining (alternatively effort bargaining) and bargaining on environmental or other investments.
Similarly, McCain (1980) has argued that without codetermination or works councils, management and employees cannot bargain over all relevant working conditions or all dimensions of work effort. As a result, workplace characteristics over which bargaining is not feasible are determined unilaterally by one of the parties, and the resulting outcome may be Pareto inefficient. McCain developed a partial equilibrium model in which works councils make it feasible to bargain over these conditions, improving welfare.
To date, there has been almost no empirical evidence for the relationship between employee voice and environmental investment. Smith (1993) presents indirect evidence based on attitudinal responses of employees in U.S. firms with varying levels of employee participation, but argues that a revealed preference approach is needed. This paper provides revealed-preference based empirical evidence, using panel data from a random sample of manufacturing establishments in the state of Lower Saxony, Germany, to test hypotheses about the relationships between environmental investments, other forms of investment, and works councils. We examine the different implications of the employee-led and firm-led cooperative investment hypotheses, using data on environmental and other investments to help discriminate between them.
The empirical analysis is based on data from manufacturing establishments for the years [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] . The analysis employs a random effects probit model. We find that the presence of a works council has a significantly positive effect on environmental investments. However, this effect is generally found only for investments that affect the workplace and the local community environment. There is no or little effect from councils on environmental 'friendliness' of firms' products, or on general innovations. Moreover, we find that councils that are 'active' in environmental matters have a substantially stronger effect than other councils. We conclude that the positive effect of councils on environmental investment is largely due to employee-led or jointly-led cooperative investments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The role of works councils in Germany is described in Section II. In Section III, we examine sources of underinvestment in local environmental quality, and develop the alternative scenarios of employee-led, firm-led, and jointly-led environmental investments. Section IV presents the data and results from the empirical analysis, and section V offers our conclusions.
II. Works councils and their potential role in Environmental Investments in Germany
In Germany, the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, or Works Constitution Act (WCA), provides for the rights of employees to elect representatives to works councils to jointly determine with management most aspects of workplace organization and activities. 2 The WCA was introduced in 1952 and reformed in 1972, 1989 and 2001 . All establishments with more than 5 employees are covered, though as a rule, the requirement that firms form councils has been enforced only when a complaint is filed that employees have requested the creation of councils. Hence, works councils are not present in all eligible establishments (Addison, Schnabel and Wagner 1997; Jirjahn and Smith 2003) .
The WCA provides for a high level of employee participation in all aspects of company planning, policies and operations. Works councils have full co-determination rights on a set of issues, including employee questionnaires, introduction of new payment methods, fixing of job and bonus rates, allocation of working hours, and the introduction and use of technical devices designed to monitor employee performance. In these areas, management cannot take action without the agreement of the works council. The councils have less strong consultation rights in matters such as changes in equipment and working methods that affect job requirements.
Participation rights in financial and economic matters cover information provision. 
III. Local Underinvestment in Environmental Quality and Works Councils
It is well known that in the presence of transaction costs, the Coase theorem fails, and firms generally invest too little in environmental protection from the social viewpoint. It is less well appreciated that in the presence of transaction costs and other employment contract rigidities, firms may invest too little in environmental protection, on a willingness-to-pay basis, even from the internal viewpoint of its own managers and employees. In this section, we argue that there are likely to be market failures in environmental investment within a firm, which works councils may help to mitigate (one of the hypotheses tested in this paper). We consider both the workers' perspective and the employer's perspective.
a. Employee-Led Environmental Investments
There are two ways workers can be affected by environmental hazards caused by the firms in which they work. First, environmental hazards might contribute to ill health within the workplace during hours of work; specifically, it may affect occupational health. Second, workers and their families who live in the vicinity of the firms may suffer from regional pollution outside the workplace. These effects have tangible costs to employees, which in principle they may be willing to pay to abate. Costs of this type of hazard are likely to be felt less by owners, who may not live in the region, or if they do, are more able to afford housing that is not downwind or downstream of the plant. Note that in this framework employees would not be expected to have a greater interest in investments affecting geographically more diffuse impacts, such as product safety or reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. In such cases, only a small part of the impact is felt locally. Thus, there is no claim implied that employees have stronger preferences for environmental investments than employers or managers per se. In fact, if top management is more concerned with general public relations at the corporation-wide level, they may have stronger preferences over product safety, greenhouse gas reductions, or other more diffuse impacts than nonmanagerial employees. Of course, ordinary workers also share a stake in the long-run financial wellbeing of the firm and its trademarks and reputation as a whole. However, they may be more interested in conditions in the plant (establishment) where they work, which may after all be sold to another firm; and in their local community, in which case a larger fraction of the benefits from environmental investments would directly impact their own welfare. Finally, in their position as employees, top management have higher incomes and thus may have higher willingness-to-pay for environmental protection.
Letting y i denote worker i's income, e i denote worker i's effort, and X denote investments in reductions of environmental hazards, the utility function U i of worker i among N possibly heterogeneous employees is given by:
with ∂U i /∂y i > 0, ∂U i /∂e i < 0. The firm's profit is:
where Q is output, C(X) the cost of the environmental investments with C'(X) > 0, C''(X) 0 ≥ , and E is the sum of efforts:
In this section we consider the case of employee-led investment. This case is characterized by ∂U i /∂X > 0 and ∂π/∂X < 0. The employer's preferences for environmental investment depend on Q(.) -C(X). It may be argued that environmental investments internalize external costs, so that they would (on the margin) reduce profits as well as conventionally measured productivity, even as social welfare would generally (on the margin) increase. Therefore, environmental investments would impose net costs on the employer. In this case workers who gain utility from environmental protection have to pay for it through lower wages or higher effort. In equation (1) we consider environmental protection as a workplace public good. Assuming that an aggregation method is available, equating the sum of marginal rates of substitution with the marginal rate of transformation between wages and pollution abatement implied by constraining the firm's profit not to fall below a given level, yields the locally efficient solution:
with ∂π ∂ / y j = −1 (j = 1, ...,N). Similarly, we may find the tradeoff between effort and environment, as
In Figures 1a and 1b we show these tradeoffs. X is the minimum level of environmental investment/protection required to comply with the (environmental, labor, or other) law. In figure 1a , y is the collectively bargained wage or the reservation wage that workers receive elsewhere; π is the corresponding profit level, and W is the workers' welfare. Workers would maximize their welfare function at the point (y*, X*).
Employers and workers could be better off by bargaining an income y* < y y < and an environmental investment X < X X * < at or below π and at or above W . Alternatively, they can bargain over effort. In Figure 1b , e is a baseline effort level that is assumed to be verifiable.
Employees and owners could be better off when they bargain an effort level e < e < e* and environmental investment X < X X * < at or below W and at or above π .
( Figure 1a , b in about here)
Although workers are willing to trade off wages or effort for reduced pollution by the firm, even a locally efficient solution like that given by equation (3) and (4) may not be implemented without a works council. First, as Dreze and Hagen (1978) have shown, it may be impossible for workers to express these preferences through the market through hedonic wages in general equilibrium. Thus, in general, competitive profit maximization does not imply an efficient choice of working conditions.
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When the price mechanism fails to express worker preferences why don't workers directly communicate their preferences to the management? One problem is that, as seen in (3) and (4) above, environmental protection is a workplace public good. 4 As Freeman and Medoff (1984) argue, the individual-voice mechanism is not effective in the case of workplace public goods. In addition, potential commitment problems are present. This is especially likely when the firm bargains with each worker and transaction costs prevent the parties from writing an explicit contract for each worker. In this case workers might fear the employer's ex-post opportunism (Dow 1987; Smith 1991; Askildsen and Ireland 1993; Freeman and Lazear 1995) . Even if there are no free rider problems, workers may not be willing to reveal their preferences when they fear other uses of the revealed information by the employer. For example, workers might fear the loss of jobs due to technological change. Or, they may fear that management might not make agreed environmental or other investments ex post, by claiming that the workers didn't exert enough effort or maintain some other part of the agreement that may be difficult to verify. Providing works councils with codetermination rights is one mechanism for building cooperative and trustful industrial relations. Of course, under some circumstances repeated games and reputation concerns can solve the commitment problem (Bull 1987) . However, the reputation mechanism may not work, because of high discount rates. Councils provided with veto rights can protect the workers' interests even if an employer does not care about her reputation. Moreover, the reputation mechanism will not work, if employees do not have enough information to verify whether or not an employer behaved honestly (Hogan 2001) . This suggests that the comprehensive information rights of the works councils and the reputation mechanism may be complementary.
The above arguments imply that there exist not-very-restrictive circumstances under which the market may be unable to induce workers to reveal and aggregate their preferences for environmental protection and to contract an explicit or implicit agreement reflecting those preferences with the employer. Without a works council workers and employer may get stuck in a situation characterized by an environmental underinvestment. This situation is depicted in figure 1a by the point (y, X) , respectively (e, X) in figure 1b. Works councils may help to overcome the market failures in environmental quality by providing a "voice institution"
enabling the aggregation of preferences, a channel for communication between workers and management the creation of trust and loyalty and a setting for subsequent bargaining over tradeoffs for environmental investment. Therefore, works councils may facilitate bargaining over environmental quality. This results in an environmental investment X < X < X*.
b. Firm-Led and Jointly-Led Environmental Investments.
In an alternative scenario we may assume that, up to some point, environmental investments may have a positive productivity effect on profitability, through increased productivity as in equation (2), or some other channel including public relations benefits that may lead to an increase in revenues or a decrease in costs. 5 In such cases, management may prefer a positive level of environmental investment, even if the regulatory constraint does not bind. Thus, in this case we assume that ∂π/∂X > 0 (∂ ∂ Q(.) / X > C'(X)) up to some level and that ∂π/∂X < 0 (∂ ∂ Q(.) / X < C'(X)) beyond this level, as reflected in Figures 2 and 3. For a given worker income and effort level the profit maximizing environmental investment X* (for an interior solution) is given by the first-order condition ∂ ∂ Q(.) / X C'(X) = 0 − . This situation is depicted for income and environmental investment. In Figures 2 and 3 above, X is the minimum level of environmental investment required to comply with the law; y is the reservation wage (or the collectively bargained wage if applicable); π is the corresponding profit level; and U denotes the workers' welfare. Note that the firm's iso-profit curve, π , has its maximum at X*. Up to X* employers would be willing to pay for higher environmental protection through higher wages, if necessary, to ensure that workers cooperate with technological change.
Figure 2 depicts the firm-led investment case, in which workers value only income, treating environmental protection as a neuter good at least in the relevant range. In principle, if the investment caused some disutility due to unpleasant working conditions, the investment could also be viewed as a bad. Given the restriction that the firm receives its reservation profit workers would maximize their welfare at the point (y*, X*). Conversly, given the restriction that workers receive their reservation utility the firm would maximize its profit at the point ( y , X*). The respective profit is depicted by the iso-profit curve π . As before the parties could be better off when there is a possibility to bargain over income and environmental protection: y < y y* < and X < X X * < . Note that employee incomes resulting from the bargaining process over environment and incomes are higher when we consider positive productivity effects of environmental investment.
The incomplete contracting arguments above can also be applied to the case of employer-led investment. If information about potential firm performance-enhancing environmental innovations are in the hands of the employer, employees might have an interest in sabotaging these investments when they fear that such innovations might have other effects such as adversely affecting bargaining power. However, if the information is in the hands of employees, they may not wish to reveal it due to fear of management opportunism. For example, the information might reduce employee bargaining power, or facilitate changes that reduce employment or have other consequences that employees view as against their interests (Dow 1993; Freeman and Lazear 1995) . Therefore, bargaining over environmental investment is more likely when a works council is present, if it is perceived by the employees as protecting their interests.
Another case may be found when firms must increase their abatement to comply with law, but workers distrust the impact of the least-cost investment strategy for doing so, in the absence of the assurance of a council. welfare and the firm's profit would increase to W * and π * when the firm invests in environmental protection up to X*. At ( y , X*) social welfare, profits and productivity are increased. It might seem that in this situation works councils are not necessary for the aggregation of preferences and for bargaining over environmental investment. However, the above arguments indicate that also in this situation commitment problems are possible; when workers fear management opportunism (e.g. the loss of jobs due to process innovation), they may find it in their interests to refuse cooperation. Moreover, workers prefer to extend environmental investment beyond X*. Workers would maximize utility subject to the given profit level, π , at the point (y**, X**). Although environmental investments might still have positive productivity effects ( 0 < ∂ ∂ Q(.) / X < C'(X) ), the strong preferences for environmental investment result in partially conflicting interests between workers and the employer regarding environmental investment, and so the aggregation of preferences and bargaining are of greater importance. In sum, employers and workers could be better off by bargaining an income * * y y y < < and an environmental investment X < X X ** < at or below π and at or below W .
IV. Empirics
We may derive three hypotheses from the theoretical considerations. The first is the employee-led environmental investment hypothesis: Workers prefer environmental investments, but internalizing external effects is not profitable for owners; or management may behave opportunistically once workers become committed to tradeoffs to gain these investments. The works council provides a "voice institution" enabling the aggregation of preferences and subsequent bargaining over tradeoffs for environmental investment. The second hypothesis is that of firm-led environmental investment: Management prefers environmental investment; and the works council then provides a mechanism to successfully implement these investments. The third possibility is the jointly-led investment hypothesis; both parties prefer environmental investments, though perhaps at different levels, but they need a mechanism for cooperation to successfully implement them. In each case, the works council enables the introduction of augmented environmental protection, although the underlying reasons for this differ.
a. Data Set
The empirical analysis is based on four waves (1994-1997) of a panel study (Hannover Firm Panel) of manufacturing establishments in the German federal state of Lower Saxony (Brand et al. 1998 ). The population covered consists of all manufacturing establishments in Lower Saxony with at least 5 employees. 7 The sample is stratified according to firm size and industry, with oversampling of larger establishments. 8 The interviews were conducted by Infratest Sozialforschung, a leading German survey and opinion research institute. In the first wave (1994), 51 percent of the establishments in the sample selected agreed to participate. In spite of this non-response rate, the difference between the planned and realised stratification is so small that the data are representative of the manufacturing establishments in Lower Saxony in 1994 and the subsequent years. The data were collected on the basis of a questionnaire in personal interviews with the owner, top manager or head of the personnel department. From the 1,025 establishments taking part in the first wave (1994), 849 establishments participated in the second wave (1995), 721 in the third wave (1996) and 709 in the fourth wave (1997).
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The questionnaire covered various aspects of establishment structure, establishment behavior and establishment performance with an emphasis on issues relating to personnel. The data set includes detailed data on profit sharing, work organization and employee motivation. In particular it includes data on works councils and on environmental investments; and it provides numerous control variables. Information on environmental investments and innovations are available in all waves and refer to each of the years 1993-1996. Pooling the data of all four waves yields an unbalanced panel.
b. Dependent Variables Table 1 Almost all of the econometric studies on the economic effects of works councils use a simple dummy variable for the presence of a council. In our initial regressions, we follow these studies by using the independent variable WOCO. Information of works council presence is only available from the first and the third wave of the panel study. Since the dropping and the introduction of works councils is relatively moderate between these waves, the information from the first wave is also used for the second, and that from the third also for the fourth.
14 There are about 59% of observations with a works council present in the pooled data.
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In the next step, we distinguish between different types of works councils. Case study and econometric evidence strongly suggests that councils are highly heterogeneous (see e.g. Wever We distinguish between councils that are active in making decisions about environmental protection questions, ACWOCO, and councils that are not active in this decision area, PAWOCO. The descriptive statistics imply that 1 in 6 works councils are actively involved in environmental matters. This distinction is relevant for two reasons. First, it can be expected that the impact of works councils is stronger when the councils actively take care of environmental protection questions. The mere presence of a council to some degree may help to build trustful relationships between management and employees. Even if the council is passive in environmental matters, employees may feel safer in presence of a works council and increased management-employee cooperation may facilitate environmental investments. However, the impact of a works council is likely to be stronger in the case that the council is actively involved in environmental protection ensuring that management takes into account the employees' interests to a larger degree. Second, it can be examined if works councils taking care of environmental protection specialize in environmental matters or if these councils generally are more active in innovative matters.
d. Control Variables
The data set is also unique in that it provides a rich set of control variables. This affords the opportunity to include indicators for the organization of work, technology, structure of the workforce and personnel problems, strategy, product markets, and for further elements of the industrial relations climate.
The industrial relations system in Germany is characterized by a dual structure of employee representation through works councils and unions. Collective bargaining agreements typically are negotiated between unions and employers' associations on an industrial level. They regulate wage rates and general aspects of the employment contracts such as working hours. 16 We include an indicator, COLLECT, of whether or not the establishment is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Establishments that are members of an employers' association are usually covered. Given the degree of centralization of collective bargaining in Germany, it is not likely that collective bargaining can take a similar role for environmental investments like establishment-level codetermination. Centralized collective bargaining rather might impose restrictions on the establishments' flexibility.
Profit sharing has been thought to provide incentives for helping on the job and to induce both cooperation among employees and cooperation between management and employees (Jones and Pliskin, 1991) . Such cooperative industrial relations may be needed whenever technological change is implemented. Further, profit sharing provides incentives for multi-tasking. 17 These incentives are crucial if a change of technology or products requires the switch from one task to another. In sum, profit sharing may foster the introduction of new technologies in the employerled or jointly-led case as well as in the employee-led case. In the regressions, managerial profit sharing, MGTPRSH, and profit sharing for employees, PRSHARE, are taken into account.
The survey also provides information on the organization of work and information related to the flexibility of the establishments on implementing technological change and new products.
The variable TEAM indicates the presence of production teams with expanded autonomy and multiple responsibilities. TRAIN is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment finances continuous training for the employees. Workers having a better understanding of the production process and an organization of work characterized by reduced specialization, multi-tasking and horizontal communication are crucial elements of a concept of flexible production. 18 The opportunity to use labor in a more versatile way may facilitate any kind of change, including environmental investments as well as other product and process innovations.
Further, variables for the technological opportunities of an establishment are included.
RESEARCH is a dummy variable equal to 1 if strengthening research and development is the heart of the establishment's strategy. The variable TECH for the use of a state-of-the-art production technology indicates intra-firm knowledge spillovers. Using a modern production technology may spur further investments and innovations. Reduced opportunities to use interfirm spillover effects are proxied by STRUC, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment is not part of a multi-establishment firm. Economies of scale are captured by SIZE, the number of employees divided by 1,000. In order to take into account a nonlinear impact of firm size, also its square, SIZESQD, is included.
The proportion of blue-collar workers, BLUECOL, is included since blue collar workers are more likely to be affected by environmental hazards. Thus, it can be expected that they are especially concerned with the local pollution impact of the firm. However, the proportion of blue collar workers also proxies a less qualified workforce and innovations may require additional skills. A negative impact of the proportion of blue-collar workers is more likely to dominate in the case of general innovations that are not primarily related to local environmental protection.
The dummy variable ABSENT is equal to 1 if excessive absenteeism is a personnel problem for the establishment. It proxies health related problems at the workplace. to be more innovative in order to increase their market share. The dummy variable PR is equal to 1 if strengthening public relations or marketing is at the heart of an establishment's strategy.
With this variable we can test for firm strategies where innovations and particularly environmental investments are aimed at gaining public relations benefits.
Product market conditions are also likely to play a role for the investment and innovation decisions. Competition has been thought to force management to reduce slack and to improve efficiency. Thus, industrial concentration and its square, CONC and CONCSQD, are taken into account. For this purpose, official German statistics are matched to 32 detailed industrial sectors identified by the survey. In order to control for industry specific pollution levels, due to differing degrees of pollution and varying abatement technology across industries, 12 from 19 broader defined industrial groups in the manufacturing sector are included. 19 Finally, REMARKET is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the regional market is the most important market for the establishment. If regional reputation concerns play a particular role for establishments with the regional market as the most important market, a positive impact of this variable on investments in improving local environmental quality can be expected.
e. Estimation Method
With the dependent variables as a categorical ('no', 'yes'), and firm-specific characteristics likely to play a significant role in investment decisions, we have used a random-effects-probit model (Butler and Moffitt 1982) . Let y it be the investment or innovation decision of establishment i (i = 1,…,N) in year t (t = 1993,…,1996) and define the following latent model:
where β β β β is the vector of coefficients, x it is the vector establishment characteristics, v it is the usual error term, and u i is a random error component that is associated with each establishment but invariant over time. 20 Failure to account for this error structure can lead to biased standard errors and erroneous measures of statistical significance. The random-effects probit accounts for the establishment level error component and provides corrected estimates of the standard errors.
Using the latent model, the investment or innovation decision is now defined by The results are reported in Tables 2 and 3 . The results show estimates of ρ, the share of total variation coming from the establishment specific error term u i of equation (5). All estimates reject the hypothesis of no random effects and yield estimates of ρ that are statistically different from zero.
In Table 2 , we report regression results using WOCO as the works council explanatory variable for each of the dependent variables. Since the findings of the other determinants are of interest in their own right, we start with a discussion of these results. While the size and statistical significance of individual coefficients wax or wane, production teams, employer provided further training and profit sharing are positive determinants for each of the eight investment variables. In sum, the findings support the notion that a flexible production concept facilitates the change of technology and products, including environmental investments as well as general product and process innovations. Similarly, technological opportunities reflected by a production technology of the most recent vintage, research and development, and establishment size increase the probabilities of environmental investments and other innovations.
Establishments not part of multi-establishment firms are less likely to implement environmental investments and other process innovations. This may reflect reduced acess to inter-firm knowledge spillovers.
As expected, the probability of environmental investments affecting local workers tends to be increasing in the share of blue-collar workers, but the probability of investments in environmentally-friendly products and in new products in general is decreasing in the blue collar share. The proportion of women shows a reversed pattern. It decreases the probability of environmental investment and increases the probability of general product innovations. Although we have controlled for line of business, this finding may reflect the sorting of women into nontraditional and less polluting heavy industrial groups within the manufacturing sector. In establishments with high absenteeism there is a higher probability of investments in down-the-line technology and waste management/recycling. These results support the notion that health related problems within the establishment are linked with problems of local environmental pollution. However, the positive link between absenteeism and product innovations might suggest that excessive absenteeism also proxies for employment relations that are more stressful in an innovative environment.
A strategy focusing on public relations and marketing increases the probability of new environmentally-friendly products. Establishments operating mainly in regional markets are more likely to invest in down-the-line technology and waste management/recycling. These results provide some evidence for the notion that in particular situations reputation concerns can play a role for environmental investment. The negative impact of a strategy focusing on regional markets on product innovations in general may indicate that a large market is necessary to provide an adequate rate of return on new products. Product market concentration has a nonlinear negative impact on process innovations while there is no significant impact on product innovations or environmental investments. These results suggest that competition spurs general process innovations but not environmental investments to increase internal efficiency. The variables for establishment age and the legal form of the establishment have little significant impact.
Turning to the variables for industrial relations, the presence of collective bargaining is significant only in the regression on environmentally-friendly products, where its coefficient is negative. Obviously, centralized collective bargaining has little influence on investment decisions made at the establishment level.
In contrast, the incidence of a works council has a positive impact that is statistically significant and quantitatively large in each of the first five regressions, in which the investment in question likely affects the workers directly. On the other hand, the coefficient on works council incidence is insignificant in the regression on new environmentally-friendly products, which represent investments that are less likely to affect workers directly, or that have an impact that is more remote from the work place. It is also insignificant in the regression on general process innovations, which reflect investments with no obvious direct effect on workers. Taken together, the unique role of works councils in environmental investments provides support for the employee-led investments hypothesis, that workers will use the channels of participation to reduce pollution from the firm that may affect their own jobs and neighborhoods. However, there is one exception to this pattern: in the regression on general product innovations. The coefficient is positive and significant, though only at the 10% level. This finding suggests that some nonenvironmental investments primarily initiated to increase the owners' profits may also be facilitated in the presence of works councils. Thus, the finding gives some support for the hypothesis that works councils facilitate jointly-led environmental investments which may increase both the workers' welfare and the performance of the firm.
However, a possible alternative interpretation of the results, raised in seminar presentations, that a "progressive management" may be responsible both for the presence of works councils and of environmentally sensitive behavior of the firm, is not supported by the evidence, because of the lack of any connection between works councils and "environmentally friendly products."
In Table 3 , we present regression results in which, in place of WOCO, we substitute as independent variables ACWOCO, which indicates the existence of a works council that is active in environmental topics, and PAWOCO, which indicates the incidence of a works council that is passive in environmental topics. 21 A main reason for this substitution is that we would expect the results first and foremost to be driven by councils that deal with environmental questions, ACWOCO. We saw from the results above that even though the active councils constitute only 1 in 6 of the councils, this was enough to provide a strong result of councils on the relevant environmental investments. This should be explained by particularly strong effects among the active councils. We expect considerably higher marginal effects for the active councils than for passive councils. This is exactly what we obtain. The specifications with ACWOCO and PAWOCO result in a sharpening of the distinction between environmental investments, likely to affect local residents, and general investments. Because the other determinants are robust to the specification of the works council variable, we report only the coefficients on the council variables.
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As it turns out, the coefficients on active works councils in the regressions on the five local environment variables are all positive and statistically significant, while those in the regressions for environmentally-friendly products and general product and process innovations are all insignificant. This suggests that works councils that actively address environmental protection questions may "specialize" in this subject. The unique role in environmental investments indicates the strength of employee environmental preferences. The active council ensures that management takes into account these preferences to a larger degree. Taken together, the results provide strong support for an employee-led role of works councils that are active in environmental topics.
The distinction between works councils that are active and passive in environmental matters also helps to investigate the role of works councils in general product innovations in a more differentiated light. A works council that is passive in environmental topics is a positive determinant of general product innovations. The coefficient is now statistically significant at the 5% level (the coefficient on the simple works council dummy in Table 2 was significant at the 10% level) . Obviously, a works council that is not active in environmental matters may well be active in other matters. The council may improve the information flow within the firm to provide management with ideas about potential innovations. Moreover, the results suggest that even a works council that is passive in environmental matters is a positive determinant of environmental investments. The mere presence of a council may help to build cooperative employer-employee relationships and to facilitate environmental investment to some degree. However, compared to an active works council that specializes to environmental topics, the marginal effects of passive works councils are much smaller in the regressions on the local environmental investment variables. While the results for passive works councils provide some evidence for the jointly-led hypothesis, the strong and unique role of active works councils in environmental investments supports the employee-led hypothesis.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper examined the impact of works councils on environmental investment by firms at the establishment level. We argued that firms may underinvest in local environmental protection even from the private viewpoint of the firm's owners and employees, but that works councils may play a role in redressing this problem. We showed that increases in investment in environmental protection in the presence of works councils could be either employee-led, firmled, or jointly-led. These alternatives were then tested using panel data from a random sample of manufacturing establishments in Germany for the years 1993-96.
We found that among establishments with works councils, about 1 in 6 have councils that are directly involved in environmental matters. Using a random effects probit model, we found a strong and robust relationship between firms' investments in improving local environmental protection and works council activities. This effect was largest when the works council is active in environmental matters. With the notable exception of product innovations, we did not find analogous effects on investments that would reduce environmental impact of the firm in ways more remote from the workplace and the neighborhood of the firm, or for other types of investment. In particular, the notion that a "progressive management" was responsible both for the presence of works councils and of environmentally sensitive behavior was rejected because of the lack of any connection between works councils and "environmentally friendly products." We concluded that much but not all of the increased investment in environmental protection in establishments with councils is employee-led, or possibly jointly-led, rather than firm-led.
In sum, the results provide support for the hypothesis that the works council is an institution Table 2 are included in each estimation but are suppressed to save space. T-statistics are in parentheses.* and ** denote levels of significance at α=0.10 and 0.05. Marginal effects are in square brackets.
Endnotes
1 See esp. Vanek, 1970 (pp. 268-270 and pp. 276-279) and 1971 (pp. 33-35) .
2 Note that employee involvement through works councils is entirely separate from the system of board-level codetermination (FitzRoy and Kraft 1993) . 3 A condition is that the number of preferences be greater than the number of working conditions. The analysis is based on a Slutsky equation for quality changes, in which the source of the discrepancy is decomposed into two components. First, an individual employee's labor supply may be affected by a compensated change in working conditions; and second, the aggregation over workers of labor supply and of preferences for working conditions obey different rules, which may lead to an aggregation bias; see Dreze (1976) . 4 As Vanek (1970) puts it, "For local residents, pollution reduction has properties of public goods: each worker may gain utility from these benefits, but this utility is not gained at the expense of any other worker's ability to likewise 'consume' this satisfaction, nor would it be easy to exclude workers from the benefits."
5 There are at least three reasons why under certain circumstances a positive impact of environmental protection on firm performance can be expected. First, many environmental investments have the effect of reducing materials waste or other wastage allowances. Second, in the longer run, such investments might increase productivity further, as they spur complementary investments or increases in skill, or possibly induce a shift to higher quality products. As Porter and van der Linde (1995) argue, environmental regulation can trigger innovations whose value can outweigh the costs of adhering to the regulations. Third, firms operating in regional markets could be interested in environmental investment because they care about their community reputation. Bargaining by works councils to obtain greater environmental protection can be similar to the effect of greater exogenous regulation; and thus responses such as those outlined by Porter and van der Linde could also apply to this case. This assumption is not required for the analysis, but helps to clarify the interpretation of some of the results. 6 An equivalent tradeoff may be present for the disutility of worker effort. 7 During the period of data collection, there were about 16,000 manufacturing establishments with five or more employees in Lower Saxony. 8 An appropriate method to handle stratification in the regressions is to control for the stratification characteristics establishment size and industry (Winship and Radbill 1994) . Note that our regressions include variables for firm size and industry dummies. 9 Since the survey is based on a voluntary participation of establishments, the decline in sample size is not unusual.
For the establishments, that did not participate in the subsequent waves, one main reason was that time limitations hindered a participation. The decline in sample size is relatively constant across size classes. This may be seen as an indication that the decline is not systematically related to central establishment characteristics (Brand et al. 1998) .
Innovation Panel, Blechinger and Pfeiffer show that investments in waste management and recycling are more frequent than investments in integrated environmentally-friendly production processes. Further, they find that employer provided training plays an important role for reducing environmental pollution. From the firms undertaking environmental investments, about two-thirds financed further training in recycling, waste management, and operating abatement technologies. Based on the total sample of firms in their panel, this pattern implies that about 14% of firms invested in the employees' education in in order to cope with the qualification demands resulting from increased environmental protection.
12 Product innovations range from follow-up products to completely new products. Studies by Smolny (2003) and Blechinger and Pfeiffer (1999) with alternative data sets from German firms show comparable descriptive statistics for product innovations. 13 Obviously, this hypothesis presumes that environmental innovations and general innovations cause to some degree similar problems of protecting the employees' interests. Empirical studies provide some evidence for this presumption. While it is widely recognized that technological change is skill-biased, the survey by Pfeiffer and Rennings (2002) shows that this also holds for environmental innovations.
14 From the 705 establishments, answering the question on works councils in both waves, 56.2 percent had a council in both waves, 2.3 percent only in the first wave and 2.8 percent only in the third wave. 15 As described in section II, the creation of a works council depends on the initiative of the establishment's employees. Hence, councils are not present in all eligible establishments. Since works councils generally address a much broader set of decision areas beyond environmental matters, a request for a works council by employees is generally separate from subsequent bargaining over environmental matters.
16 While bargaining over the wage level is the domain of unions but not that of works councils, most empirical studies find a robust positive link between the presence of works councils and wages. This suggests that councils can use their codetermination rights to obtain employer concessions on wages. Thus, bargaining over wages and environmental investment between works councils and employers, as described in section III, is a very plausible scenario given the institutional framework in Germany. 17 See Drago and Turnbull (1988 ), FitzRoy (2001 ), and Jirjahn (2000 for formal analyses of profit sharing, cooperation and multi-tasking. 18 See for example Milgrom and Roberts (1995) . 19 Since several of the 19 industrial groups contain relatively few establishments in the sample, only 12 dummies industry dummies are included. 20 If the cross-sectional units are drawn from a large population, it is reasonable to view firm specific constant effects as randomly distributed across these units. Compared to a fixed effects approach, the random effects model has the
